After 13 years from the collapse of the
security sisteme characterized by American-Soviet bipolarity, which
had established the world order for fifty years the analysis of the
decisions and actions of international political actors, offers new
elements for a wider interpretation of transformations occurred in
the geopolitical environment at a global level.
The political decisions in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the
terrorist attacks in the United States and the Iraq War represent
the most important and relevant actions which will influence the future
of the international geopolitical environment. Thus, if the anti American
terrorist attaks triggerd a new start of the new global America΄s
policy, acknowledged also as a explicative frame for the most of events
and subsequent political decisions, the crisis generated by the American
intention to attack Iraq and the war development, represent a complex
phenomenon, with long term influences on the international policies
of the states also present on the configuration process of a both
European and global security system architecture.
In opposition with the political actions generated by the
11-th September attacks, that also triggered, as far as the international
relations system, is concerned unanimity, approval, multilateral support,
enhanced cooperation and legal support, the Iraq war created some political,
diplomatic and economic series of contradictory reactions, as fellings
of frustration, disapproval or even diplomatic conflicts and strategically
Although it is very probably that the United States wanted
to deal with the Iraqi regime at a certain time, the anti-American terrorist
attacks had reveald the moment for thaht. On the 17 September 2001 the
american president signed a document wich confirmed the American intention
to fight against international terrorism. The panic and the horror unleashed
by the attacks had the role to credit USA with trust and to offer the
moral support or even justification for its all subsequent actions.
America was looked at with sympathy and compassion and all the states
and organizations offered their support, either symbolic or real to
fight against this plague named terrorism.
This support even took the form of bilateral and multilateral
agreements on counterterrorism, similary to the one signed with Russia
in May 2002, which reaffirmed “the previous arrangements expressed before
the 21st of October 2001 had the role to fight against terrorism of
all forms, and we honor the international coalition efforts against
the terrorism beginning with the tragic events of the 11th September
2001.” That was a legalization of an important
institutional framework based on international agreements, between US
and Russia (in this case), which solicited the international organizations΄
support – G8, European Union, OSCE, 6+2 Group, NATO-Russia Committee
– to enhance bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts, actions that
demanded low enforcement, intelligence, but also diplomatic, political
and economic activities.
The international political system had never seen such
unanimity in admitting and solving problems. The entire institutional
arsenal, at a bilateral, regional and multilateral level, was in the
hands of the community interest while the United States had the leading
role in this retaliatory mission. The proportion and the significance
of those acts, experimented just in the case of the United Nation Organization,
were also invested with international authority, symbolical power and
the liberty of action by the leading nation: USA. Obviously, other states
that suffered from terrorist threat where ready to proceed with institutional
adjustments meant to deal with this problem – this was also seen as
an opportunity to enhance power and social control.
Without insisting on the american power and other authority
configurations in 2002, we must specify that this enormous politically,
institutionally, economic and symbolic investment, was left unfinished.
What does this mean? The Afghanistan war nither ended by capturing the
leaders of the “Al-Qaida”- network, nor by the annihilating or destroyng
the terrorist groups, wich ment the removal of the Taliban regime form
Afghanistan. Little on the contrary, it was pretty much, but still not
enough. Some analysts considered that the stake in Afghan war was much
more than fighting against terrorism.
The Iraq War and the Separation in Terms of Interests
Although there were some comments, about a possible American
next target, after the Afghan war, early soundings of America΄s
intention to destroy the Iraqi regime, generated the first disaaprovals
of the international community. This is why the connection between the
counterterrorism and the Iraqi regime could be found in the fight against
the hostile international cooperation regimes, which also supported
financially and logistically the terrorist groups. These were exactly
the efforts made by the American and British diplomats to find and explain
the link between Al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime. The connections were
easily rejected, because the intelligence reports that made the analysis
had never convinced the international community, already engaged in
fight against the terrorism, of the necessity of this kind of actions,
especially when the political, economical and strategic consequences
far beyond their capacity of control.
As the American pressure on Iraq increased, many states
had intensified their diplomatic actions to regroup around UN, considered
by some of them the only international organization capable to stop,
through unilateral actions, the deterioration of international relationships.
Even though, UN and US threats, to comply with the United Nations resolutions,
adressed to Iraqi regime had began in November 2001, states and organizations
did not react until the United States tried to force UN to adopt a firm
position. That’s how the 1441, 1447 and 1454 UN resolutions appeared,
stipulating more firmly the international community requirements as
far as the Iraqi regime.
Consequently the diplomatic conflict wich was concerned
last until the end of the Iraq war started. The United States of America
begun the attack of the Iraqi regime with its entire political, diplomatic
and military force.
In March 2002, the number of Americans who appreciated
the policy of G.W.Bush was very high (82 %). 88 % of Americans where
approved the President΄s activity in the war against terrorism,
although they were 10% fewer beginning with October 2001 and finally
only 66% considered as adequate the way, that Presidency acted to prevent
terrorism, also 72% of them supporting a military intervention to remove
the Saddam regime.
America had a strong internal support as well as allies
abroad, even thuogh the support of the president decreased, as the diplomatic
crises had extended. The Great Britain, Canada, Australia, countries
form Europe, Asia, Latin America offered diplomatic or military support
for a military intervention against Saddam regime. Eloquently is the
case of the American query to exempt on the national territories of
other states the American military personnel from the law trials during
antiterrorist war; Romania was one of the European countries that offered
that kind of protection to American soldiers, incurring critics from
European Union partners. That represented an important American test
to verify the sustainability of the project, as well as the new allies.
Moreover, American troops were already in the Gulf region
and had their aircrafts patrolling above the excluding area in Northern
and Southern Iraq, military bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Turkey and the Marine fleets were in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean
Even though US officially declared the specific term of
disarming the Iraqi regime (among other objectives), analysts affirm that other interests reprersented
the American motivations in this war:
- To complete military operations that had begun in
the first Gulf war and to provide regional security trough massive
- To diversify the oil supply of United States and
to control the transport routes and terminals from Gulf area;
- To strategic reshape the Middle East in order to
start the modernization of the muslim-Arab world, to integrate it
in the democratic system and to install the regional prosperity;
- Implication of Americans in the eradication process
in the center of the terrorist phenomenon.
- To rebalance the power lines in Middle East, to reduce
the pressure on Israel, Turkey, to create the Palestinian State.
- To strengthen military support for America΄s
interests in the Caspian region and also in communications lines
and transport routes towards safe regions.
In this political-diplomatic conflict between USA, on one
side, and France-Germany-Russia, on the other side, the US leading alliance
was numerical inferior but strategically superior. The Defense Secretary
Deputy, Paul Wolfowitz stated that USA had succeeded to form a “formidable
alliance” that would support American policy concerning the Iraqi crises.
The geostrategic significance and the power of their allies was the
main argument of Americans.
The countries of Commonwealth, leaded by Great Britain, also assured
military capabilities for U.S., if the situation required, but also
the minimum legitimacy of his international actions. Without the force
of Blair΄s political support, United States would have had a problem
in justifying their actions.
From American perspective, the opposition of some occidental
economic powers, wich were also reliable partners for America, didn’t
represent an insurmountable obstacle. The single concern for Americans
was not to prolong forever the expectation, given the fact that the
dollar had started to lower on the financial markets, the price of the
oil barrel continued to be high and the American economy would have
been affected on long and medium term. Having the experience and the
precedent of the war from Bosnia and Kosovo, when states from the Western
Europe that now opposed to action, took part at it, the precedent of
declaring the war without having the agreement of the NATO Security
Council, served as a base of negotiation and legitimating the American
action, if they ever needed it for removing (turning out) the political
regime in Baghdad. The state that caused serious problems to Americans
was Turkey, for consenting to the opening of a front in the north of
Iraq, from the Turkish territory; the leadership from Ankara negotiated
toughly the conditions for supporting this plan. Although they didn’t
receive the necessary sums of money from the Turkish economy, the Turkish
Allies raised serious problems to tue American army, delaying the start
and the end of the war – 40 American transport ships loaded with military
equipment and personnel had to go around the entire Arabian Peninsula
in order to serve the U.S.Army.
As far as the East European American allies, were concerned
countries as Romania and Bulgaria, because of their categorical position
on the American administration side, provoked the disaproval of France,
President Chirac declaring that the candidates pro-American attitude
will have consequences on the admission in the European Union. Romania
and Bulgaria made public their opinions, from the very first moments
of the crises and, although President Bush considered the allies that
US reunites to be “a coalition of voluntary states”, an American Senator
appreciated that it will be much more correct to speak about a “coalition
of bribed states”. Romania and Bulgaria have risked
their diplomatic relation with other states and could be targets for
terrorist attacks, stated Los Angeles Times in March 11, 2003. American
administration declared at the beginning of the war that it will do
its best to reward the political behavior of Romania and Bulgaria, President
Bush sent Don Evans, Secretary of Commerce of United States, for thanking
those countries and announcing a series of American investments and
granting them the status of “functional market economy”. Even if other
Eastern and Central European States supported American policy, countries
as Hungary, Poland, Czechs, and the Baltic States were much more moderate
in statements and actions. Romania and Bulgaria bet on an economical
and political compensation in exchange for their support.
Regarding the relations with Russia, USA went up to threatening
it with economical and geopolitical losses if Russia used its veto at
the Security Council of UN to reject the US resolution to apply military
actions against Iraq.
Some conclusions can be drawn from the above statements:
- Security Council could not obstruct USA actions;
- No other international actor could influence the
American decision to attack Iraq;
- US negotiated economic and political interests only
with reliable allies, excluding in their decision the sharing of
economical benefits with important strategically partners such as
- US reaffirmed its hegemonic position on the international
political arena in difficult geopolitical conditions. Furthermore,
US threatened with retaliation the opposing countries;
- The international law system, including institutions
created to ensure stability and prevention of wars, demonstrated
that they were not adapted, at that moment, to this kind of political,
diplomatic and military confrontation and that they still didn΄t
have the capability to oppose US policies.
- This political and diplomatic conflict revealed the
vulnerability of European and international institutions in front
of an American challenge.
France, on the other side, led a much more heterogeneous
coalition than US. Germany, Russia, China, India, Muslim countries and
states from different continents along with France did not support an
American intervention without UN Security Council approval. French role
in this international action meant to limit the American position was
obvious; France organized a diplomatic campaign of an international
rally on all continents.
Not only France supported the safeguard of the international
relations system based on the law. “It is an attitude based on the international
law and on the international community capacity to solve crises without
making automatically use of military force”, declared the Spokesman
of the French Government on March 13 2003.
In fact, France motivations are far more complex. France, like other
European countries – Russia for instance – had their economic interests
in the Persian Gulf region, interests already compromised by the American
intervention. French companies had contracts in Iraq, within the Oil
for Food Program, the same with the Russian companies that collaborated
for 15 years with the Iraq in oil industry. Despite of the French-Iraqi
economic cooperation, those elements could not represent the fundamental
motivation for its opposition to American intervention. Being the threats
with economic retaliation and loss of possible participation at post-war
Iraq reconstruction, France should have had to moderate its political
speech about war and start negotiating with America. It’s obviously
that other geopolitical consideration laid at the basis of Paris΄
political decision. France sought the opportunity of creating a power
balance capable to offer it the desired credibility and authority in
the international system. As a single actor on the international stage,
France ceased to play a significant role in the international relations
since the end of the First World War but as an actor within the European
Union, its importance is enhanced by the entire institutional mechanism
that functions in Bruxelles. It is difficult to understand how Germany
rallied to the French position despite its 50 years lasting strategic
partnership with USA, within transatlantic relation, but it’s sure that
Germany expectations are related to the common European political project
based on institutionalism and cooperation that will function for a long
time from now on. France lost much more in the economic field than if
it had cooperated with the Americans but it hopes that the political
and economic outcome that followed the confrontation will make the difference
on long term. Since the end of the Cold War, French companies had major
losses – in oil field and armament sales - in Middle East and it is
possible that France intended to try to balance power relations through
Even if France had a history of special relations with
the Arab countries, it couldn’t do anything to prevent the American
action toward getting control over this geostrategic area. Michele Alliot-Marie
declared in an interview, granted to a Greek newspaper, that France
opposes to “the preemptive wars” and it wants to create a “peaceful
disarmament organization” in view of preventing international crises.
French officials consider that “the preemptive war concept is opposed
to the collective security that is based on the respect of international
legitimacy and authority of Security Council”. Underlining that even
other countries could represent “a threat to peace”, countries such
as North Korea, the French minister declared that “for this reason,
France solicits the creation of an efficient organization for peaceful
disarming, mechanism meant to offer guaranties to international community”. This means that the French attempt to adapt the Western interests
within world geostrategic area trough its institutionalism, is either
incapacity to adapt means to new realities, either a non-realistic strategic
option. The fact that there are no reliable institutions to deal with
security in a specific part of the world and the fact that French, along
with other states, cannot create these institutions, shows its weakness
in international arena and that it cannot ask for supplementary rights.
The discrepancy between French external political intentions and reality
seems the same with the difference between the French external political
project and the European project. As the former French Foreign Minister,
Hubert Vedrine explained in March 2002, France
has made progress in adapting its institutional mechanism toward a fast
evaluation of external political decisions because “we don’t want to
influence neither the France expressions nor its capacity to negotiate”.
It is obviously that France policy is fully adapted to the European
realities but concerning other geostrategic areas, France cannot provide
or create more security or crises management. France position adopted
in the case of Cote d’Ivoire is typically for France external policy:
applying military procedures to solve a conflict, even if affects French
interests, is taking place with the necessary delay to exhaust diplomatic
France intention to use its veto and to stimulate other
state to do so, arouse major critics from its allies who accused Paris
supports for authoritarian regimes, allegations expressed considerations
that France acted as an “enemy” and should be treated in consequence.
Even if France call for use of international in crises
case and some of its intentions were honorable, there are few elements
that raise questions about its motivations:
- respecting UN resolution and continuing with international
inspections prolonged Iraqi people sufferance as much as solving
fast the crises; French partisan position, as much as other powers,
did only start the war and make speculations on America legitimacy
of action; it is possible that unanimity with regard international
pressures would have made possible full cooperation of Saddam, if
not his peaceful removal;
- the French support for an authoritarian regime, with
consequences on human rights and humanitarian catastrophes by using
a legal practice that proved its inefficiency in several occasions
– Bosnia, Kosovo – could offer justification for other oppressive
regimes in other world regions. These raise a question that is it
worth putting in balance people’s sufferance with the maintaining
of juridical and institutional statu-quo?
- Considering UN the only “source of legitimacy” for
an international action, limited at this moment, to actions and
opportunities meant to urge the extension of democracy and the security
of human rights in the world;
- France tendency toward strategic dominance is under
its economic, politic and military capabilities – that was the reason
of trying to gain advantages in a favorable geostrategic situation.
Thus, even if its intentions with regard of European Union
and the creation of a European defense and security identity are commendable,
those have to be put in balance with a more widely vision of solving
crises without a military force capable to provide credible threats.
It configures two perspectives regarding security projection in world:
one is based on international law and enhancing cooperation within a
unite Europe and the other one of based is force threat followed by
cooperation. France will be part in the first camp.
Regarding Germany, anti-American policy of Gerhard Schroeder
Government is something new in transatlantic relations. Despite inconceivable
two years ago, Germany fallowed France diplomatic campaign without hesitations.
Although the German press condemned sometimes Schroeder foreign policy,
the German-American partnerships abandon could have consequences on
long term even though US declared that that it is willing to “ignore”
for the moment Berlins aggressiveness. The economic interdependence
of German stockholders in multinational corporations makes difficult
the Germany reprisal trough economic instruments. In fact, United States
preoccupation for its partner is much more profound then this particularly
diplomatic conflict. If European Union does not succeed in becoming
an autonomous military power, the partnership will be renewed.
Concerning Russia, US threatened a couple of times that
it was going to revenge any attempt of opposal in the Security Council,
it declared that they would cease their cooperation in the energetic,
strategic, military partnership and even clearing investments. An interesting
fact is that, even though the American-Russian partnership was considering
to based on the cooperation in the energy sector, esspecially the oil
one, new studies revealed that the cooperation should be built in other
fields like the nuclear one.
The focus on oil had eclipsed the fields where American interests could
successfully cooperate with the Russian interests: the development of
new technologies to produce nuclear energy and the nuclear waste management,
field of tremendous benefit for both sides, as the Russian analysts,
David and Nadejda Victor demonstrate. Even though American policy was
not completely adequate in supporting of the American-Russian partnership,
it is certain that they have special interests in developing it. If
American investments did not succeed in supporting economic recovery
and development of Russia, the cooperation in security matter prevails
in front of other domains. According to an American official, at the
end of war in Iraq, Russia “should be forgiven” – when France should
be “punished” and Germany “ignored” – demonstrate the importance of
On the Russian side, President Putin΄s statement from
March 17 2003 was edifying for its attitude during the diplomatic conflict
and after even more important, for the entire group formed with France
and Germany. “It is a first step toward a multipolar world”, declared
Vladimir Putin, commenting in Paris, on February 10th, the France-German-Russia
tripartite statement against the war.
The general intention of the Russian diplomacy is the creation of a
international relation system which is not completely dominated by the
winner of the Cold War, meaning the US, and that allows the other powers
a maneuver range and the possibility to influence Washington’s external
policies. The conditions being given, Ilia Fabricinikov, researcher
at the Political Study Center – PIR, stated that an imposed war, won
by the USA, would not correspond to Russian aspirations. Apart from
personal opinions, Russia did not indanger its partnership with the
USA, but earned the European partners respect, economic partners much
more important than those across the Ocean.
Even if France,Germany and Russia did not have any geopolitical
or geostrategic advantage, in the middle of Iraq΄s crises, these
states have succeeded to rally on the common point and create the premise
of a possible future counterpart to the American hegemony; it is not
possible for the moment, but there are new opportunities for the three
As far as NATO is concerned the Iraq΄s crises and
its end brought again, in specialists attention, the role and the capacity
of the Alliance to face the threats of the XXIth century. The debates
related to military intervention outside (???) influence and legal area
were followed by those concerning the readiness (???) of the Alliance
to play a key role in the reinforcement of peace in Iraq but it seems
that Germany has categorically opposed to that strategy. NATO decided
its neutrality in this conflict, rejecting even the security guaranties
for Turkey (a week after Germany decided to send in Turkey its AWACS
aircraft). Besides, NATO has much more accurate objectives as the intensive
integration of new members, of the candidates, as well as its decision
Related to the European Union, the diplomatic conflict
and the Iraq war revealed the weakness of this European institution,
the separation between states on this subject being given. The announced
war against the Saddam regime divided the European Union, by creating
to camps with irreconcilable positions; their different opinion conflict
canceled year and year if efforts towards European security and defense
project (???). The High Commissar for common foreign and security
politics of EU, used to his mediator role in reconcile the disagreements,
was forced at the end of February to recognize his failure: “That day,
all was destroyed, because each part sustained totally different positions,
without even trying to give consideration to a compromise solution”,
declared an European diplomat.
The European Summit held in Brussels on March 20 this year,
adopted a common statement concerned Iraq, reaffirming the “fundamental
role” of the United Nations in the international relations and gave
promises for a humanitarian aid of EU and demanded protection of the
territorial integrity of Iraq.
According to diplomatic sources, the official text, that was adopted
much more rapidly, in an extremely divided context over Iraq΄s
crises, was stating the necessity that the UN “continues to have a central
role, during and after the actual crises”. On the other side, the document
sustains the protection of “territorial integrity, sovereignty and political
stability in Iraq”. It is obviously that the EU failed to produce the
necessary consensus over a political common decision and that was happened
because of the opposing interests involved in this conflict.
At this point the evolution events might lead to a series
of conclusions concerning ulterior developments on the European and
- The diplomatic conflict between the two camps, the
US and its opponents, was a powerfull conflict, that pursued the
balance of power in the world and an attempt to break the American
- France, Germany and Russia have not succeeded in
creating a counterpart of the US security projection system; they
have obtained just a symbolic advantage in the contingency of a
Russian participation to institutional security mechanism in Europe
and, probably, the promise of an enhanced economic cooperation on
the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis.
- The Iraqi crises reconfirmed the hegemonic position
of the United States within the international relations system.
- The diplomatic conflict between the two sides will
continue after the end of the war, motivation strong enough to enable
us to affirm that the conflict has much more profound motivations
and that it is the result of different goals over the new world
security at different levels.
Some analysts consider that this political and diplomatic
conflict, which burst out in the Iraqi crises, has deeper roots. This
phenomenon could be explained through a series of geopolitical projects
with civilizing vocation which coordinates the international actors’
policies. The two political parties, US with its allies and France-Germany-Russia
axis and its supporters propose different patterns of evolution in the
international relation system.
Gerard Dussouy analised these security patterns of the
political future of the world through the perspective of three geopolitical
he considers that, on the basis of a dialectics homogenization/ heterogeneity
process, might had to occur 3 patterns in the new world order:
1.The planetary pattern concerning the perspective
of the world and the global communication;
2.The hegemonic homogenization pattern;
3.Antagonist heterogeneous pattern or disorder.
Thus, according to his theory, the first pattern represents
the dominant perspective in the world and both security projects, that
we mentioned are included in this perspective. His supporters’ state
that it deals with harmonious order of world business based on a universaly
spread democracy, despite cultural specificity, the generalization of
mass consumption and trade. The modernization, the uniformity of the
societies generates a community, that guaranties universal peace and
in which communication plays an important role in the “annihilation
of will power and of violence in interstate relations, eliminating the
irrational attitudes of political leaders.”
Opposed to this convergence of change and communication
forces is the resurection of laical or clerical nationalisms, the demographic
curve outburst viewed as a sign of cultural burst. Also, contradictory
tendencies appear in the concerning western culture and the acculturation
process can raise questions about its cultural identity. The American
pattern has more chances to undergo as an integration project of “a
double social and moral dimension“– seen as an equivalent of democracy,
human rights and free market. In this pattern, the difference between
the US and EU will be considerable and concessions as well as counterparts
supported by the democratic ideal throws questions at the system΄s
conversion towards democracy. Cultural dialog will mean just accommodation
and the “neutral languages” acquisition, such as English, produce cultural
conservation. The most important assumption is that it is less likely
that western values would be capable to assimilate all cultures without
being itself influenced. Cooperation in the security field assures the
future spread of democracy throughout history meaning that the hegemonic
interventions do not solved the crises. The paradox is that as the dialog
and institutional negotiations enhance, security is far from being reached.
Communication on the other hand creates a feeling much stronger then
the economy. Despite the American hegemony and its proclivity to mediatizate
its culture, humanity remains split in mental patterns.
Even though America controles, at a global level, most of the political
and economic messages, we cannot speak about a global public opinion.
Promoting the democracy in the detriment of a much stronger national
environment is the contemporary paradigm. Even though the UN configures
a new manner of international relations, this institution cannot represent
the future of an alliance with a universal vocation. The globalization
and the correlative trends of economic regionalization have accelerated
the negotiation proceses and so the transparency in international relations.
The “heterogeneously homogenization” and the “disorder”
patterns raise much more contradictory problems and don’t produce order
principles. These patterns state that the self-determination right triggers
imperialist nostalgias. Also state dismantling raised questions about
equity in international relations. The hegemonic homogenization pattern
is considered to be a cautious manner to go back to interdependency
or integration paradigm because it expresses an inadequate process of
a stable power structure which has the tendency to uniform national
and social entities through the same laws.
We think that three aspects compete to its accomplishment:
- Through globalization, the burst of welfare through
a new form of transnational capitalism – “the new economy” assisted by the communication regulatory function;
- The demographic equilibrium and the integration of
- Actors ideological conformation which suggest 2 scenarios:
pax Americana or pax democratica.
Moreover, NATO’s expansion is considered to be the fulfillment
of an American internal foreign policy and of a strategic objective
in Europe, without complying with the European requests just like the globalization
collects resources and direct them to the American economy. The international
organizations reform by sharing the roles and responsibilities is not,
at least for the moment, an American priority because it could undermine
the US position in the world. And without the US, such a reform is impossible.
The antagonist heterogeneity or disorder is based on binomial
optimism/pessimism related with the future potential of international
relations system. The recurrence of a series of phenomena such as the
“feudal” way to
go back to firms autonomy or the recurrence to the territorial or cultural
reshape is explained as a double phenomenon of saturation and proliferation
that threatens the world with disorder.
The phenomenon’s proportion is related to two principles:
sensitivity and vulnerability. “Within a atomizing logics of capitalism,
the modern western concept on the world, shocked them because of its
impotence to built a new world order”. This skepticism manifests itself
at two levels: a theoretical one and a practical one. The ideologic
incapacity to shape the international environment is a drift of values.
From the practical point of view, the absence of a shared and admitted
global conception prevent us from believing in the creation of a normal
society. The frontier denial becomes another saturation source. The
globalization of the work market creates big companies new “transnational
as a capitalism counter reform. The social perspectives saturation risk
to accelerate along with the rising heterogeneity of populations and
the intensified migratory fluxes; those think along with other phenomena
creates profound and frustrating contradictions. Attitudes and behaviors
which derive from such ideological discrepancies shape the international
political environment related to the outbreak and the development of
State policies regarding relevant action toward redefining
security environment in Europe, and not only, reflects one or more tendencies
within the three patterns. If for the United States the globalization
and hegemonic homogenization fits just well, the contrary tendencies
within the second pattern, combined with elements within the disorder
and globalization scenarios define the entire European decisional arsenal
regarding its future.
The United States policy is in the favor of maintaining
actual hegemony given the fact that it permits the pursuing of its national
interests without being punished. The US lead the most significant security
alliance in Europe and its power allows ---- taking major decisions
sometimes just by itself. The NATO enlargement was an American decision
and not a European one, backed just by the Germans who wanted a territorial
protection from its former enemy Russia. Gradually, the American attention
was directed to the Middle East area and the center of Eurasia, to rich oil areas; there the United States
tries to create a security system that will allow its safe exploitation.
The American security strategy is based on the extent role
of regional security alliances such as NATO. The well-known American analyst, Zbigniew Brzezinski
considered that America has an additional 4 major characteristics of
its power, attributes that we can consider also strategic priorities:
1.Economic regional cooperation (APC, NAFTA) and through
international specialized organizations such as World Bank, IMF,
2.Proceedings which stress consensus based decisions
even if they are dominated by US;
3.The preference for democratic relations between the
most important alliance members;
4.A judiciary and constitutional world elementary structure.
Obviously some characteristics of the American foreign
policy, as Brzezinki later admitted, are no longer representing its
interests, as the decision to renounce to the juridical international
support for its actions in the Iraq crises demonstrate.
America promotes its own global security project because
it is considered that a world without their power is much less secure
and with much less prosperity. Brzezinski states that the US should
have three major political objectives after the Cold War: avoiding the
anarchy, blocking the rise of another rival concerning power and prolonging
its supremacy. The
recent events occurred on the international stage can confirm the American
international policy trend. By seeking and stimulating strategic partnerships
in Europe, Middle East and in the Far East, US tries to built new security
systems that permit the achievement of its objectives. USA would want
to see their allies – especially from the NATO – engaged in actions
outside its legal influence area and, also, that Europe could handle
its own security problems without eliminating, of course, the transatlantic
relation within the European security architecture. In order to promote
these strategic goals at global level, America relies on its allies
or “geopolitical players” as well as on “ its geopolitical pivots” and takes care of their protection and welfare.
Countries such as Germany, Turkey and Japan will always be supported
for their geostrategic significance and for their capability to activate
on the international stage.
The Afghanistan and Iraq wars have showed the geostrategic
and geopolitical importance of Eurasia for America. The US, the only
world superpower, started the conquest of the “heartland”. American
troops are for the first time in history in the heart of the Eurasian
continent with the clear intention to build a security system that will
allow them to stay as long as it is necessary. The US have many strategic
priorities in the most relevant areas of the world:
- The construction of a lasting relation with China,
seen as the regional power;
- The pacifying of the so called “Eurasia Balkans”;
- The European integration and its consolidation;
- An adequate relation with Russia and drawing it in
a series of regional and global security projects.
Those projects proove that America is determined to influence
in the future, the security of the global policy and the result of those
efforts will produce a new world security architecture. The United States
have the power and the political will to project and shape the future
of the world but that does not mean that its policies will not be influenced
by other international players. But the course of action belongs to
On the other side, the European project led by France and
Germany, within the European Union, whose divergent interests with US
don’t limit to the access and control of important geopolitic areas,
aim at the creation of a stable and secure economic and political area.
But Europe is in a much complex situation then the Unites
States are. Its non-unitary cultural characteristics and the necessary
time for its institutional edifice reflects in its problems but this
does not mean that they will not succeed in this project. Europe still
has problems with the defining and the functioning of its institutions
and that reflects in the promotion of its international projects. Much
more stable than other geographical areas, the European Union is an
important player end hopes to become much more powerful than it is now.
The European project of building new security architecture is based
on a legitimate and feasible international juridical system but raises
serious doubts, how much time it will lost about and about the mechanism
capacity to work in conditions of rapid change and of multiplying challenges
of today΄s world. But time will decide which project is the most
adapted one for the challenges of the future.
It’s hard to assert that the European Union is more democratic
than the USA but the European integration project is one of most innovating
cohabitating systems known to human kind and its decision mechanisms
are a great example for the political communities of the present.
The difference between pan-European development pattern,
as referring to the liberal-institutionalist perspective of Europe,
and the American communitarian perspective could be decisive in the
foreign policy in which the rapidity of the American decision process
could not be matched by the complex and heavy European mechanism. If
the dispute for resources and markets has begun than the US started
with multiple advantages: it is the only superpower, no other competitor
can reach its military and technologic capabilities, the international
relation system don’t permit to sanction its international political
behavior and the economy and the states are more adapted than ever to
The asymmetric confrontation on different levels favors
hegemonic homogenization but does not eliminate opposing tendencies
and if the United States will have a moment of weakness, the European
Union and other players will certainly take advantage of it. Those two
political projects with civilizing vocation, the American and the European,
will confront in future and will influence the political future of humanity.
White House Press Release, May 24, 2002.
Donald Rumsfeld declarations about American objectives in Iraq, 22 March
Economist Nicolas Bavarez, L’Expansion, February 2003; Erich Marquardt,
US Government Objectives in Iraq, Power and Interest News Report, 21
Mediafax, 11 March 2003.
Los Angeles times, 11 March 2003.
Alexander Vershbow, American ambassador Moscow warned, in an interview,
that Russia could suffer economic and geopolitical losses if will use
its veto in UN Security Council to reject US resolution that authorize
military action against Iraq, Mediafax, 11 March 2003.
Mediafax, 13 March 2003.
French Defense Ministry interview, Michele Alliot-Marie in greek Elefterotypia
newspaper, quoted by Mediafax, 14 March 2003.
„Cohabitation, Europe: comment se fabrique la politique etrangère?”
In Politique Etrangere, 4/2002.
Statement of the president of International relations Affaires Subcommittee within the
Representing Chamber, republican Douglas Bereuter, quoted by Mediafax,
„Axis of Oil?”, David G. Victor and Nadejda M. Victor, Froreign Affaires,
Mediafax, 17 March 2003.
France Presse comment, quoted by Mediafax, 16 March 2003.
Mediafax, 20 martie 2003.
Gerard Dussouy, Quelle géopolitique au XXI siècle,
Éditions Complexe, 2001.
Idem, p. 294.
Apud, Alan Greenspan, President of Federal Reserve, p. 301.
Apud, Pascal Boniface, p. 305.
NATO and the Caspian Security: a Mission Too Far?, Richard Sokolski,
Tanya Charlick-Poley, Rand.
A New Persian Gulf Security System, Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik,
and David Gompert, Rand 2003.
The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1997, romanian edition,
Univers Enciclopedic, 1999.