The development and diversification
of the norms in public international law, through the emergence of some
autonomous law systems such as the regional or the specific ones, like
lex mercatoria (rules in international trade) or the regulations
regarding the law of the sea, the international protection of the human
rights or of the environment have generated a direct concern towards
the “threat” implied by an objective process of international
law’s fragmentation and especially the relationship which should
exist between the general dispositions and those of the autonomous systems
which become more and more present in the international law system.
Such situations may actually occur in four different cases:
a) In the case of a conflict between different interpretations
of the general international law. Such a situation has occurred
in the Tadic case.
The Decision of the Appeal Chamber of the Criminal Court for the
Former Yugoslavia included the term “general control”
instead of “effective control” used by the International
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case,
as a criterion to define the situations when a military or paramilitary
group can be considered as having acted on the behalf of a foreign
b) In the case of a conflict due to an action that
can be considered as an exceeding of the general international law,
by applying provisions following special laws. A situation like
this is the Belilos case
concerning an interpretation of the reserves regime different from
the general practice of the international law.
c) In the case of a conflict generated by the application
of a special law that contradicts the stipulations of the general
international law. Such an example is given by the Gatt panel’s
decision to solve the 1994 differences in the Dolphin and Tuna
upon the idea that the provisions regarding the protection of the
environment are not relevant in the commercial cases.
d) The conflicts which can appear following the emergence
of self-sufficient law systems, at a regional level, drawing up
special compulsory norms for the member states which can differ
from those of the general international law.
Given the fact that the European Union is one of the most
juridically structured regional systems and the relationship between
its system of juridical principles and norms and those of the public
international law has a special practical importance, for Romania also,
I have considered that a presentation of the subject can be useful.
While examining a juridical order, the first problem that
occurs is to determine the process of creating the juridical norms which
compose the order in question. These norms give to certain facts the
power to generate juridical effects, transforming them in what we call
“acts generating norms” normeszeugende Tatbestande (in
German) or law sources.
These norms have a specific validity, during a certain period of time
and in a given place. At an internal level, a norm can be valid inside
a certain region or the entire state.
The same thing applies to the public international law.
The phrase “communitarian law” refers to the
set of juridical rules following the treaties that have founded the
Communities, from the acts adopted by their institutions while exercising
the attributions offered through the treaties and also from the agreements
concluded by the Communities with other states or international organizations.
In the international documents, the notion of general international
law appears only one time as such, except for the cases when general
law principles are mentioned.
By general public international law we must understand
a system of principles and norms considered by the state as being international
rules unanimously accepted, even if they are customary or conventional
2. The Communitarian Juridical
The communitarian juridical system has the quality of representing
a juridical order, that is an organized and structured set of
juridical norms with its own sources, organs and procedures capable
of elaborating and interpreting them, but also of ascertaining and punishing
the transgression of these norms, when necessary.
The priority of the communitarian juridical order is strictly
related to the direct effect, because when the principle according to
which the dispositions of the communitarian law can directly create
rights and obligations comes into force, there can be, inevitably, certain
conflicts between the two systems. The principle of the communitarian
law’s priority doesn’t appear in the concluded treaties,
but it was recognized by the European Court of Justice in two famous
cases. The first one is the Van Gend en Loos decision from February
5th 1963 and the Costa vs. Enel one form July 15th
1964. This decision
stipulates that “an internal law disposition cannot oppose to
the law created through communitarian agreements, by its very autonomous
unlike the regular international treaties, the founding treaty of
the European Community has given birth to its own juridical order, integrated
in the member states juridical systems. The same decision stipulates
that, by creating a Community for an unlimited period of time, with
its own institutions, juridical personality and capacity, international
representation right and especially with authentic powers as a result
of the limitation of the states’ competences or of their transfer
towards the Community, the states have limited their sovereign rights
in some specific fields and thus have created a law corpus applying
to their followers and to themselves.
This approach on sovereignty is no longer the traditional
abstract one, conceived almost as a metaphysical, indivisible and inalienable
quality like in the classic doctrine elaborated by Bodin and Hegel and
developed by many others, which seemed to be an inherent element of
the state. This
is a new conception of sovereignty which corresponds to the idea of
the sovereignty’s division, which doesn’t mean its binding
to a certain area of the state’s territory, but to some of its
was the first one to develop the idea of the division of sovereignty,
surpassing the concept of sovereignty expressed by the International
Court of Justice in the famous Wimbledon Case, when the Court
decided that the conclusion of any treaty didn’t mean the abandon
of sovereignty, because the very right to conclude treaties was an attribute
This new approach regarding sovereignty allows us to speak
about the “divided” sovereignty or the one “exercised
together” by states and organizations such as the European Community,
because the state doesn’t have the exclusive competence to exercise
the attributes of sovereignty on its territory. Such an approach can
lead directly to an analogy with the model represented by the federal
states. This analogy would be forced and exaggerated, given the fact
that in the federal system the states give up certain fields of actions
in favour of the federation (defense, foreign affairs etc.) and, on
the other hand, the relationship with the European Communities doesn’t
mean the delegation of competences, but of the exercise of certain competences
that doesn’t allow the states to intervene by actions which are
incompatible with the communitarian rules.
Such an example is the common commercial policy regulated by the 113
article of the EEC Treaty and which is of the unique competence of the
Community, including when it comes to concluding commercial agreements
with third states.
The Juridical Personality of
the European Union
According to the general theory of international law, the
states are international law subjects and the international organizations
are only derived law subjects, with a functional limited personality.
The founding Treaties of the European Communities stipulate that, in
the international relations field, they have the necessary juridical
capacity to fulfill their functions and achieve the established objectives.
The European Communities have the right to negotiate and conclude international
treaties; they enjoy diplomatic immunities and privileges and have the
right to active and passive legation. Thus, the 210 article of the EEC
Treaty (the 184 article of the Euratom Treaty) clearly stipulates the
juridical personality of the Community. The 6th article,
2nd paragraph of the founding Treaty of the Coal and Steel
Community says that “concerning the international relations, the
Community has the juridical capacity to exercise its attribution and
achieve its objectives”. These general dispositions permit the
clear recognition of the fact that each of the Communities has the juridical
capacity to exercise its functions and accomplish its objectives, which
means that they have a certain international juridical personality.
The classical attributes related to the international juridical
personality refer to the right to negotiate and conclude international
treaties, to appear as part in front of the international courts of
justice or to participate in other international procedures for the
solution of conflicts, and also to have active and passive international
The European Community Treaty clearly stipulates its right
to conclude international treaties.
These ones refer to the external aspect illustrated by the European
Communities’ participation, in their own name, to the activity
of certain international organizations and also by the set of agreements
concluded with third states.
Besides the right to conclude agreements, the Community
has developed a network of diplomatic missions, exercising the right
of active and passive legation. It has over 150 such missions accredited
at its headquarters in Bruxelles. These missions also called delegations
or representations have a diplomatic statute and their functions are
the classic ones: to represent, to negotiate and to inform. There are
also additional functions to the classic ones: to participate to the
activity of the consultative organisms of the Community and also to
fulfill the tasks which rests to the executive organisms of the Communities.
The European Community doesn’t have diplomatic delegations in
other countries, where each state is represented by national embassies.
Nevertheless, the Community has accredited 45 delegations inside the
countries in development which it cooperates with, and another 15 in
other states (Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, USA,
India, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, the
former Yugoslavia), two regional delegations in Caracas for the Latin
America and in Bangkok for Asia, four delegations with the international
organizations (in New York with the United Nations, in Paris with the
EOCD, in Geneva and Vienna with the European headquarters of the United
Nations). The European Community has over 120 such delegations, at the
moment. The EU Commission
doesn’t have the exclusivity of the external representation. The
Presidency of the Council is also represented in third states by the
diplomatic mission of the state which exercises the temporary Presidency
of the European Union. The EU’s capacity to appear as part in
front of international arbitral courts has been lately recognized.
Even if the Community has important external competences,
its member states are still responsible regarding their foreign policy,
but this one makes the object of a consultative and coordination system
inside the common foreign and security policy (ECSP) which is seen as
an intergovernmental cooperation pillar by the founding Treaty of the
Neither the Maastricht Treaty, nor the Amsterdam or the
Nice ones don’t include such clear disposition regarding the recognition
of the juridical personality of the EU. After having included in the
Treaty of Amsterdam the provisions regarding the possibility offered
to the Council of the European Union to conclude treaties in fields
like foreign affairs and justice, based on the common decisions of the
member states, the
idea of the EU’s juridical personality started to be considered
as implicit. Moreover, these dispositions have already been used in
the European Union’s practice, to conclude the Agreement between
the European Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding
the EU’s monitoring mission on the 9th of April 2001,
and the European Commission has started to speak in the name of the
Union and not of the Communities.
However, recent evolutions have shown that the clear stipulation of
the EU’s juridical personality has become only a matter of time,
absolutely necessary given its growing part at the international level.
Communitarian Law and National
The relationship between communitarian and national law
is based upon two fundamental principles: the priority of the communitarian
juridical order over the law of the member states and the direct effect
of an entire set of communitarian dispositions which apply directly
to the states and to their citizens.
The direct effect of the communitarian norms refers
to the capacity of the communitarian law to be a source of law on the
territory of the member states, to directly create rights and obligations
not only for the communitarian institutions and member states, but also
for their citizens and to allow these ones to appeal to them in front
of the national courts in order to obtain the recognition of a certain
right or to stop the application of any internal provision which is
incompatible with the communitarian law.
The Principle of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity is included in the European
Union Treaty at the 3B article, taken over from the European Community
Treaty in the following form: “In the fields that do not belong
to its exclusive competence, the Community will intervene, according
to the principle of subsidiarity, only in the case and to the extent
which the objectives of the action taken into consideration cannot be
sufficiently accomplished by the member states alone and can be better
achieved at a communitarian level, due to the dimensions or the effects
of the action”.
The disposition concerning this principle is followed by the one referring
to the principle of proportionality frequently used by the European
Court of Justice: the action of the Community will not exceed what is
needed to achieve the objectives of the treaty. The Maastricht Treaty
transforms subsidiarity into a “principle” of the European
Community and Union.
The fact that, during the latest negotiations of the intergovernmental
Conference for the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, this principle
has been included in the disposition part and not in the preamble, as
initially intended, seems to show that the negotiators have considered
it as a principle with a compulsory juridical value. This is
also the opinion expressed by the European Council of Lisbon, in 1992.
It is clear although that, at this moment, this principle is especially
of a political nature in spite of its recognized juridical value. It
is true that it represents first of all a principle based on common
sense, an element of clarity and democracy. The only danger that can
appear and must be taken into consideration in the practice of law is
that it shouldn’t be used in an offensive manner, that is opposing
or diminishing the field of application for the communitarian competences.
If it is used to assure an optimum exercise of these competences, in
a spirit of cooperation and solidarity between the different levels
of competence, it will become one of the fundamental principles which
will assure the integrated evolution of the European Union, because
it is necessary to any federal structure.
We must keep in mind, however, that this principle doesn’t
apply to the fields of the EU’s exclusive competence. Subsidiarity
is frequently used to justify the necessity of the decentralization
of communitarian law’s application, even in the fields of exclusive
competence for the Union.
3. The Relationship Between the European Union’s
Law and General International Law
The problem that occurs, from a theoretical but also practical
point of view, is if communitarian law represents or not a juridical
order that is autonomous from the global order based on the public international
law. If in the first case brought in front of the European Communities’
Court of Law (the Van Gend en Loos case in 1963), the Court stated that
there was a new juridical order of public international law,
in the Costa vs. Enel decision in 1964, the Court referred only
to an autonomous source of law, represented by the communitarian
treaties, without telling that this was part of the public international
law. Thus, during
one year, the notion of communitarian law as public international law
order has being replaced with an autonomous law order, even if this
one has been founded upon sources following the international treaties.
Thus we are facing different options, from the point of
view of the analyzed theme, with practical effects upon the relationship
between public international law and the communitarian law order.
According to the classical theory of public international
law, a juridical order is considered as autonomous if it fulfills two
conditions: the former is that its founding law norms shouldn’t
be interpreted or applied by other institutions that the ones of the
order in question and the latter is that this order should be self-sufficient,
meaning that it shouldn’t need to appeal to other principles or
rules except for the ones included in the founding treaties of that
order. These are at least two conditions that we will take into account
in order to find an answer concerning the relation between the communitarian
order and the public international law order.
Concerning the first condition, the founding treaties
of the Communities give the European Communities’ Court of Justice,
in practically identical terms, the right to assure the respect of the
law norms regarding their interpretation and application in the relations
between the member states.
These dispositions can be interpreted only as provisions which give
the judiciary organism of the Communities a general and exclusive
competence regarding the regulation of these problems. Moreover,
the Court’s regulation procedures exclude the application of the
public international law rule concerning the appeal to all the internal
means of attack before bringing a complaint in front of the Court.
In the Humblet case,
the Court decided that “the prior resort to all national judiciary
means of attack is out of the question because this would mean to submit
the same case to the decision of the national courts”. Moreover,
the possibility of direct appeal for the member states’ citizens
and, in some cases, directly in front of the Court, and also the mechanisms
of cooperation between the national and communitarian judges give more
force to the conclusion that this basic rule of public international
law, the resort to all the national means of appeal, doesn’t function
inside the Communities.
Besides these competences, the European Communities’
Court of Justice can interpret the communitarian law and can also assure
its autonomous development. Communitarian law can be the object of only
one compulsory interpretation, given by the Court of Justice. This interpretation
is not exercised, like in the national law, only by the decisions of
the Court regarding the analyzed cases. The Court of Justice has also
the autonomous function to assure the unitary application of the communitarian
law for the whole Community, even in the cases when the national judges
are competent to apply it.
Following the presentation above one can easily conclude
that the communitarian law order fulfills the first condition to be
considered an autonomous juridical order from the one of the general
public international law.
The second condition for a juridical order to be
autonomous is that the source of law which founds it should be sufficient
and that it shouldn’t need to resort to any other principles or
From this point of view, the situation of the communitarian
law remains different. The communitarian treaties couldn’t foresee,
as any other juridical text, all the situations which should be regulated.
On the other hand, the authors of these juridical documents have been
more preoccupied by the regulation of the economic issues and less by
the juridical aspects, usually limited at the institutional aspects.
The obligation to fill in any gaps naturally belongs also to the European
Communities Court of Justice. While exercising this attributions, ECCJ
recognized from the very beginning of its activity that it had been
making use of the “common principles and approaches resulting
from the national law systems of the member states” during this
process of interpretation.
The Court of Justice has proved to be more reticent regarding public
international law, considering that the use of international law principles
and norms could affect the specific nature of communitarian law. The
ECCJ has directly affirmed the subsidiary nature of the appeal to the
dispositions of the public international law and, implicitly, its proceedings
being abandoned when incompatible with the communitarian law. These
cases are frequent in the jurisprudence of the Court. One of the most
well-known such cases refers to the non application of the non adimplenti
contractus exception. The non application of this exception
isn’t due to the fact that the international treaties wouldn’t
recognize the reciprocity principle, but to the fact that an institutional
system of ascertaining the non-fulfillment of the obligations by a state
has been established through these documents, thus eliminating the possibility
for a state to adopt counter-measures according to the provisions of
public international law.
This exception of reciprocity is not the only international law rule
that has been excluded from the communitarian law. A similar situation
is the one concerning the estoppel or the foreclosure, in the
cases when this exception refers especially to the issues concerning
the Communities’ institutional structure.
Another example refers to the Court’s refuse to recognize the
juridical effects of the states’ and international organizations’
unilateral acts, considered as law sources in the general theory
of the public international law.
Another classic example frequently quoted is the interpretation
given by the European Court for Human Rights in the 1995 Loizidiu
the effects of territorial reserves, different from the one of the International
Court of Justice. The ECCJ decision in this case touches an entire field,
the human rights, where communitarian norms prevail upon the norms and
principles of public international law.
These examples illustrate the fact that in some cases the
European Communities have advantaged their own norms in the detriment
of the general ones. Meanwhile, we must take into account the fact that
communitarian law doesn’t regulate all the aspects of the relationship
between its members and that, in some cases, the norms and principles
of international law must be used. The relation between the two systems
is proved by the simple conclusion that the European Union is an international
organization with a clear specific nature, but an organization which
must obey, nevertheless, the general rules of the public international
law regarding the creation and functioning of these international structures.
Of course, these relations aren’t univocal because the EU, in
its turn, has an influence upon the law of international organizations.
It has been conceived following a specific model, different from the
one of other classic interstate cooperation organizations. The European
organisms have a more developed and complex institutional structure
and also with competences which overtake the national competences of
the states, having as an objective the creation of an integrate system
closer to the structure of a federal state than of an international
organization: a common economic policy, a single currency, a communitarian
citizenship, a foreign and security policy, armed forces etc.
A second obvious relationship between general international
law and the EU’s law refers to the law of the treaties. The member
states have been building up these European structures by concluding
international treaties governed by the rules of general international
law concerning the negotiation, the conclusion and the functioning of
the treaties, as coded by the Vienna Convention regarding the law of
the treaties. This enumeration could continue with the evaluation of
other fields where the connection between the law of the European Union
and the general international law is obvious, but this is not our purpose,
but to prove the fact that European law isn’t built up out of
nowhere, but upon the general norms of public international law. These
once proved, we must admit that the European law has in the same time
the clear tendency of becoming an autonomous system of public international
law, not only with a clear specific nature, but also with specific dispositions
which differ from the norms of general international law.
This analysis proves, in our opinion, that even if the
communitarian law order is frequently described as an autonomous juridical
order, independent from the member states’ national juridical
orders and also from the general public international law, it seems
to be basically an intermediate order with a high level of autonomy,
but which is not created on an empty field, but in the context of the
norms of general public international law which apply, mutatis mutandis,
to the communitarian relations, except for the cases when they risk
to put in danger their specific nature.
Starting from the European example, but also from other
precedents, the International Court of Justice in Hague has started
to draw the attention upon the danger of the “fragmentation”
of the international law due to the multiplication of the international
organisms of jurisdictional nature and to the emergence of some autonomous
systems of juridical rules, in fields like human rights, commercial
disputes or the protection of the environment.
Such cases, as well as others presented in different academic works
as examples of “fragmentation” of public international law,
dangerous to its functioning and also to the entire international scene,
are in fact only problems regarding the development and diversification
of international law. This one has started indeed, from the very beginning,
with the regulation of some specific fields: either regarding the relations
between two or more states, or concerning a specific theme. Famous founding
works in international law such as the ones of Hugo Grotius do not refer
to international law as a whole but to specific fields like the law
of war and peace or the law of the sea. Along with the codification
process after World War II, “the law of the treaties” and
“diplomatic and consular law” have become currently used.
Notions like “humanitarian law” regarding armed conflicts
or “human rights” are currently used in the academic literature.
We could wonder what could be the new elements which came
along and determined this kind of preoccupations at the international
level. It is beyond doubt that one of these elements is the development
and diversification of the norms of international law following the
growth of the complexity of the fields which it is supposed to regulate.
A second element is the evolution regarding the organization
and functioning of the international society. After the important stage
of multilateralism, general and global regulations, great global conferences
of codification of the rules in general public international law, such
as the Conferences organized by the UN in Vienna,
the efforts to solve all problems at a world level, usually by the UNO,
we are in the middle of a globalization process to which public international
law must also adapt. The unique approach, in this new situation, is
the example of the neoliberal theory concerning the minimal state. The
application of this vision to the international society’s functioning
means to accept a set of values, principles and norms unanimously accepted
and valid for all the democratic nations and a minimal international
structure to assure their respect. The United Nations Organization can
be this structure, reformed itself to answer the new conditions. It
is obvious that such a minimal structure couldn’t respond to the
growing complexity imposed by the globalization process.
It would have to be completed by the regional regulations such as the
European ones or by specific regulations for every field such as the
law of international trade, human rights, the protection of the environment
The natural question that appears refers to the manner
in which these specific fields will relate with general public international
law, the set of values, principles and norms that are unanimously accepted
by the democratic states. I believe that this relation should be governed
by fundamental principles of public international law such as in
toto jure genus per specie derogatur rule or the generalia specialibus
non deogant rule. Other rules regarding the interpretation of the
successive treaties or other such general rules can be added to the
basic ones aiming to solve the conflict between the norms of public
A supplementary argument to the ones already stated is
the fact that, following the International Law Commission’s session
in 2002, it was
decided that the activity regarding the fragmentation of international
law should begin by a series of studies upon precise themes such as
the ones mentioned above.
Following the Commission’s Report, these themes are:
- The functioning and the sphere of application of
the lex specialis rule and the problem of “autonomous
- The interpretation of the treaties following “all
the pertinent rules of international law which can be applied in
the relations between the parts” in the context given by the
general evolutions of international law and the preoccupations of
the international communities
- The application of successive treaties which regulate
the same field
- The modification of the multilateral treaties in
the relations between the parts
- The hierarchy of the norms in international law:
jus cogens, erga omnes obligations, the article 103 from
the United Nations Chart.
At the 55th session in 2003, the International
Law Commission has started its session with the very examination of
these rules, the first theme being the lex specialis. The objective
of the Commission has been to elaborate, following a series of analysis,
certain recommendations for the states’ international activity,
which seemed to show that the approach stated above would be adopted
in the end. Of course, the elaboration of such rules of conduct would
have to be accompanied by an effort to assure the dialogue between the
international jurisdictional institutions which allow the unitary and
coherent application of the different rules in international law: general
rules, special rules or regional rules.
Decision regarding “The Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic”, case
no. IT-94-1-A, A. Ch., July 15th
concerning the “Military and paramilitary activities inside and
against Nicaragua” (Nicaragua vs. The United States, The ICJ
, p. 14, par. 109–116.
vs. Switzerland case, The ICJ Decision from April 29th
the documents of the European Court for Human Rights (Series A), no.
132, par. 60.
restrictions imposed by the USA to the tuna importations and the decision
adopted by Gatt, document WT/DS26/AB/R February, 13th
General Theory of Law and State,
Cambridge, 1945, p. 110 and
123, and also Julio Barberis, “Les règles spécifiques
du droit international en Amérique Latine”,
des cours de l’Academie de droit international
, vol IV, 1992,
Hague, 1993, p. 93–223.
Barberis, op. cit.,
p. 113 – 114.
Boulouis, “Le droit des Communautes Européennes dans ses
rapports avec le droit international general”,
des cours de l’Académie du droit international
vol. IV, 1992, p. 19.
Droit communautaire général
, Paris, Masson, 1983,
6/64 case, in The Hansen Collection of ECJ Decisions, p. 1251.
Victor Louis, L’ordre juridique communautaire,
1993, p. 15.
Pescatore, Le droit de l’integration,
Leyden, 1972, p.
72 and the following.
Victor Louis, op. cit
., p. 20.
the “ECJ Decision from December 15th
the Donckerwolcke Case
in the Hansen Collection, p. 1937, which
stipulates that the states can intervene when it comes to common commercial
policy only if the EEC allows them to do so.
the 113rd article referring to commercial agreements, the 238th
article referring to association agreements etc.
Louis Dubuis, Les rapports du droit régional et du droit universel,
« Colloque de Bordeaux de la societe francaise pour le droit
international », Paris, Pedone, 1977, p. 271.
Victor Louis, op. cit., p. 77.
Groux and Manin, op. cit
., p. 153 – 161.
the provisions of art. 24 of European Union founding Treaty.
A. E. M. Neuwahl, “Legal personality of the UE”,
European Union and the International Legal Order
, Hague, Asser Press,
2001, p. 22.
Bribosia and Anne Weyemberg, “La personnalité juridique
de l’Union Européenne“,
in L’Union Europeenne
et le monde après Amsterdam
published by The Institute
of European Studies, 1999, p. 60.
Dony, Droit de la Communauté et de l’Union Européenne,
The University of Bruxelles Editions, 2001, p. 117.
dispositions of the 3B article, 2nd
the Papers of the Maastricht Debates: Subsidiarity and the defiance
EIPA, Maastricht, 1991.
Victor Louis, op. cit.,
decision of the ECJ on February 5th
1963 in the Van Gend
en Loos case.
decision of the ECJ on July 15th
1964 in the Costa vs. Enel
the disposition of the article 31 of the Coal and Steel Economic Community,
article 164 of the European Economic Community and article 136 of the
the ECJ decision in the Humblet case, on the 16th
1960, case 6/60 in the Hansen Collection, p. 1127.
Boulois, Le droit des Communautes européennes dans ses rapports
avec le droit international général, op. cit,.
the decision of the ECJ in the case A.M.& S, May 18th
1972 in the Hansen Collection, p. 1575.
the case Costa vs. Enel, July 15th
1964, doc. cit, the Hansen
the case the Greece vs. the Council, September 27 th 1988, case no.
204/86, the Hansen Collection cit., p. 5323.
vs. Turkey, Prelimiary Objections, the decision of March 23rd
1995, ECHR Papers (Series A) no. 310.
Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law?
in Lieden Journal of International
, no. 15, 2002, p. 554.
the Convention regarding diplomatic relations, April 18th
1961, the Convention regarding the consular relations, April 24th
1963, the Convention regarding the law of the treaties, May 23rd
1969 and others in “Commission du droit international et son oeuvre”,
edition, New York, 1997.
Teodor Melescanu, Speech at the UN international law Commission plenary
session, July 24th
the Report of the International Law Commission, the 54th
session, UNO Document A/57/10, supplement no. 10, p. 272.